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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the fight against fraud, no tool is more valuable to the federal 
government than the False Claims Act (“FCA”).1  Last year, the Civil 
Division for the Office of the Attorney General recovered $3.5 
billion dollars in FCA recoveries.2  Of the $3.5 billion dollars in 
recovered funds, the Civil Division was able to recover $1.9 billion 
dollars from federal healthcare programs and another $1.9 billion 
dollars from fraud related to government contracts.3  These 
recoveries are important given the rampant degree at which fraud 
occurs every year. 
The Civil Division’s success in protecting the public coffers 
cannot solely be attributed to the dedicated attorneys serving in the 
Office of the United States Attorney General.  Under the FCA, a 
private citizen is able to file a “qui tam suit,” which allows a private 
citizen, known as a “relator,” to bring a civil action against 
defrauders on behalf of the federal government.4  In successful qui 
tam suits, the relator is eligible to receive a portion of the money 
recovered.5  Private citizens play a large part in the recovery process 
as well.6  These rewards are more than a mere pittance.  Last year, 
relators received roughly 19.7 percent of the $2.9 billion dollars in 
fraudulent payments they helped the federal government collect, 
representing $597 million dollars in rewards.7  Last year also marked 
the fifth year relators filed more than six hundred qui tam suits on 
behalf of the federal government.8 
Currently, the FCA only excludes certain categories of 
individuals from serving as relators.9  Curiously enough, attorneys 
are not one of them.  This Note will explore the case law and ethical 
rules and dilemmas associated with attorney-relators.  First, this 
 
 1  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.5 Billion 
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015) (available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-35-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015). 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2016).  In 2015, 423 lawsuits were filed under the qui 
tam provision of the False Claims Act.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Fraud Statistics –Health and 
Human Servs. (Nov. 23, 2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/796866/ 
download. 
 5  31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
 6  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.  In 2015, 423 lawsuits were filed under the qui 
tam provision of the False Claims Act.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4. 
 7  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4. 
 8  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4. 
 9  31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2016). 
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Note will discuss the statutory background of the False Claims Act.  
Second, this Note will examine federal and state court decisions 
examining whether attorneys can properly serve as relators in qui 
tam suits against their former clients.10  Third, this Note will include 
an overview of the ethical and evidentiary problems attorneys face 
when bringing a qui tam suit against a former client and how these 
requirements frustrate the government’s goal of rooting out fraud 
through the FCA.  Finally, this Note will conclude with a discussion 
of how the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) loyal disclosure 
rules strike a healthy balance between permitting attorneys to 
expose fraud while also preserving client relationships. 
II. FALSE CLAIMS ACT STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
A. The Beginning 
The FCA prohibits individuals from making fraudulent claims 
for payment against the government.11  Private citizens are 
authorized to bring qui tam actions on behalf of the United States 
government against defrauders.12  These suits derive their name 
from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac 
parte sequitur, meaning “[w]ho sues on behalf of the king as well as 
for himself.”13  The FCA originated during the Civil War era.14  At 
the height of fighting between the Union and Confederate soldiers, 
the government faced significant problems: Union soldiers received 
barrels of gunpowder that contained nothing but sawdust, 
shipments of uniforms weaved from rags fell to pieces when they 
came in contact with water, and contractors billed the Union for the 
same mules and horses time and time again.15  The persistent abuse 
led Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts to introduce the first 
version of the FCA to the Senate on January 16, 1863.16 
 
 
 10  United States v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2013); Bury v. 
Cmty. Hosps. of Cent. Cal., No. F036667, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035 (May 8, 
2002); United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp. 862 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D. Va. 1994) (Doe III). 
 11  31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2016). 
 12  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2016). 
 13  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009). 
 14  James B. Helmer, False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for 
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1264-66 (2013). 
 15  Id.; James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui 
Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, The 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and 
Their Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 35 (1991). 
 16  CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 348 (1863). 
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Senator Wilson decried the “bands of conspirators,” who 
“plundered the treasury day after day.”17  Although the halls of the 
Senate had “rung with denunciations of the frauds of contractors 
upon the United States,” Senator Wilson explained the government 
had no adequate law with which to punish these defrauders.18  
While explaining the structure of the FCA, Senator Howard quipped, 
“[i]n short, sir, I have based [the provisions of the FCA] upon the 
old–fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, and ‘setting a rogue 
to catch a rogue’ which is the safest and most expeditious way I have 
ever discovered of bringing a rogue to justice.”19 
President Lincoln signed the FCA into law on March 2, 1863.20  
The statute permitted individuals to bring an action on behalf of the 
United States government or themselves, against any person in the 
service, or called into the service, of the United States government 
who knowingly submitted false claims for payment.21  Defrauders 
were forced to pay double the amount of damages sustained by the 
United States as a result of the fraud, as well as a two–thousand 
dollar penalty per false claim.22  As an incentive for bringing these 
suits, the individual bringing the qui tam action was entitled to half 
of the government’s recovery.23 
B. Parasitic Problems 
The FCA remained unchanged until 1943 when a rash of 
“parasitic lawsuits” filed by abusers of the statute’s qui tam 
provision spurred Congress into action.24  The abusers would hide 
out in federal courthouses in hopes of stumbling across an 
indictment of a government contractor for false claims.25  Upon 
hearing the indictment, the individual would file a qui tam action, 
allowing some relators to collect rewards for wrongdoing they 




 17  Id. at 956. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. 
 20  12 Stat. 696 (1863). 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Helmer, supra note 14, at 1267–68. 
 25  Helmer, supra note 14, at 1267–68. 
 26  Helmer, supra note 14, at 1267–68.  
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In response to abuse of the qui tam provision, the 1943 
amendments to the FCA significantly changed the Civil War era 
statute.27  To combat the filing of the redundant lawsuits described 
above, relators were required to turn over all evidence to the 
government at the time the action was filed.28  Additionally, the 
revisions required courts to dismiss qui tam suits if the government 
possessed knowledge of the fraud when the action was filed.29  The 
government would then have sixty days to determine whether or not 
it would bring the claim against the accused.30 
The 1940s amendments also significantly changed the reward 
structure of the FCA.  Congress reduced the amount of money an 
individual could receive as a bounty for bringing the action.  In cases 
where the government chose to pursue the case, the maximum 
award was capped at ten percent.31  If the government decided not 
to pursue the case, the individual was entitled to receive no more 
than twenty-five percent of the award.32  The revisions did not 
guarantee relators a reward, however; Congress gave the ability to 
award damages to individuals solely within the discretion of the 
court.33  A judge could award nothing if she deemed it appropriate.34  
These changes eliminated most qui tam suits for a number of 
years.35 
C. The FCA Reborn 
Congress took action to strengthen the FCA after a second wave 
of fraudulent claims for military spending raided the public coffers 
in the early 1980s.36  Organizations billed the government absurd 
amounts of money for relatively inexpensive items.37  On October 
27, 1986, President Reagan signed into the law the second set of 
amendments to the FCA.38 
 
 27  89 Cong. Rec. 7570, 7571 (1943). 
 28  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1943). 
 29  Id. § 3730(d)(4). 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. § 3730. 
 32  Id. § 3730(d)(1). 
 33  Id. § 3730(d)(3). 
 34  31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (1943). 
 35  Helmer, supra note 14, at 1271. 
 36  Helmer, supra note 14, at 1271. 
 37  Helmer, supra note 14, at 1271–72. 
 38  False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 
3153 (1986). 
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The 1986 amendments adjusted the proportion of the recovery 
a relator would receive.39  Successful relators were listed to receive 
between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the recovery if the 
government decided to intervene, and between twenty-five to thirty 
percent of the recovery if the individual pursued the case on his 
own.40  Regardless of whether the government chose to intervene, 
relators retained the right to participate in the litigation.41  Congress 
increased the ante for the federal government from double to treble 
damages.42  The penalties associated with each false claim were 
similarly increased to between five thousand and ten thousand 
dollars.43  A successful relator could also recover legal expenses from 
the accused.44 
Furthermore, Congress enacted several protections to shield 
employee relators from retaliation claims.45  The FCA provides that 
employees, contractors and agents who are “discharged, demoted, 
suspended, threatened, harassed or in any other manner 
discriminated against” are entitled to all relief necessary to make 
them whole if the aforementioned actions were in response to the 
individual’s lawful acts done in adherence to the FCA.46  The 
available relief could include: 
. . . reinstatement with the same seniority status that employee, 
contractor, or agent would have had but for the discrimination, [two] 
times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and 
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the 
discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ 
fees.47 
The 1986 amendments also brought substantive changes to the law. 
Congress clarified the necessary degree of intent required to 
establish a violation under the FCA.48  The amendments also 




 39  31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) & (2) (1986). 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. § 3729(1)(G). 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. § 3730(c)(1). 
 45  31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1986). 
 46  Id. § 3730(h)(1). 
 47  Id. § 3730(h)(2). 
 48  Id. § 3729(b). 
 49  Id. § 3731(c). 
DUMNICH NOTE - MACROS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2016  11:19 PM 
2016] GOING ROGUE: ATTORNEY-RELATORS 473 
Congress attempted to remedy its de facto elimination of qui 
tam suits by addressing the controversial “government knowledge” 
defense from the 1943 amendments.50  The solution Congress 
settled upon was the “public disclosure” exception.51  Under this 
exception, a relator is barred from bringing a qui tam suit based 
upon a public disclosure of the alleged wrongdoing by the media or 
a criminal, administrative, or civil hearing.52  If, however, the relator 
was the “original source” of the information and possessed direct 
and independent knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing and 
voluntarily provided the government with the information before 
filing a qui tam action, the relator was permitted to pursue the 
claim.53 
D. Congressional Clarification 
In response to decades of court decisions interpreting the 
language of the 1986 amendments, Congress enacted the most 
recent substantive changes to the FCA through a series of 
amendments spread across three statutes: the Fraud Enforcement 
and Recovery Act (“FERA”), Patient and Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”), and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act (“Dodd–
Frank”).54  Congress was concerned that judicially imposed 
qualifications and limitations “undermined” the effectiveness of the 
FCA.55  Court decisions imposing these limitations allowed 
“subcontractors and non-governmental entities [to] escape[] 
responsibility for proven frauds.”56 
FERA made significant changes to the FCA, including rejecting 
the intent requirement created by the Supreme Court in Allison–
Engine v. United States ex rel. Sanders.57  In Allison–Engine, former 
employees of a subcontractor filed a qui tam suit alleging the 
subcontractor submitted invoices to two shipyards falsely certifying 
the subcontractor had constructed a set of generators.58  The 
 
 50  31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (1986). 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. § 3730(e)(4). 
 54  Pub. L. No. 111–21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25 (2009); Pub. L. No. 111–148, 
§ 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901–02 (2010); Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1079A(c), 124 
Stat. 1376, 2077 (2010). 
 55  H. R. Rep. No. 111-97, at 2 (2009); S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 10 (2009). 
 56  S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 10 (2009). 
 57  Allison-Engine v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008); S. Rep. No. 
110–507, at 6 (2008). 
 58  Allison-Engine, 553 U.S. at 662. 
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Supreme Court held that a subcontractor was not liable under the 
FCA because claims for reimbursement were only submitted to the 
general contractor and the shipyards, not the federal government.59  
In the Court’s view, relators must prove defrauders intended for 
their false statements to be material to the government’s decision to 
pay or approve a false claim.60  Subcontractors around the country 
began using the Allison–Engine decision to have FCA claims from 
relators dismissed, allowing numerous frauds to be carried out upon 
federal programs typically protected by the FCA.61 
Congress noted that such a holding was not only inconsistent 
with the legislative intent of the FCA, but also created a new defense 
for subcontractors.62  Dissatisfied with the Supreme Court’s holding, 
Congress amended the definition of “claim” to include a request or 
demand for money or property regardless of “whether or not the 
United States has title to the money or property.”63 
The FERA amendments also expanded FCA liability to include 
any person who makes or uses a false statement material to a false 
claim.64  Additionally, the protections originally only available to 
employees were expanded to include contractors, agents, or 
associated others.65  Congress further stipulated that complaints 
proffered by the federal government were to relate back to the 
original relator’s filing date if the Government’s cause of action 
arose out of the conduct or transaction of the prior relator’s 
complaint.66  Changes were also made to the seal provision of the 
FCA.67 
The amendments to the FCA made by the ACA targeted what 
Congress believed were misinterpretations of the public disclosure 
bar.68  In Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. 
United States ex rel. Wilson, the Supreme Court extended the public 
disclosure exception to include not only information obtained from 
federal administrative hearings, audits, or investigations, but also to 
state and local information sources.69  Congress disagreed with the 
 
 59  Id. at 671–72. 
 60  Id. at 665. 
 61  111 S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 8–9 (2009). 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. at 19. 
 64  31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (2009). 
 65  Id. § 3730(h)(1). 
 66  Id. § 3731(c). 
 67  Id. § 3732(c). 
 68  110 S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 21-26 (2008). 
 69  Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 
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Supreme Court’s interpretation of the public disclosure exception, 
and explained that only three sources of public information could 
bar a qui tam suit from being tried: a federal hearing, a federal 
report, or the news media.70  The government also retained the 
ability to waive the dismissal of claims based upon the three types 
of public disclosure.71 
The changes incorporated in Dodd–Frank pertained to the 
appropriate statute of limitations for retaliation suits brought by 
whistleblowers.72  The Supreme Court previously ruled the 
appropriate statute of limitations was to be determined by 
consulting “a comparable statute in the state in which the retaliation 
had occurred.”73  Congress rejected this interpretation of the statute, 
and instead stated the appropriate statute of limitations for all 
retaliation claims brought by whistleblowers would be three years 
after the alleged retaliation occurred.74 
From its very beginning, the FCA has been a powerful tool in 
the fight against fraud.  Congress unequivocally reversed the 
limitations placed upon the provisions of the FCA in the 1940s by 
the urging of the Department of Justice with its full throttled support 
of the law in the 1980s.  The most recent revisions to the law, 
drawing bipartisan support, have shown that Congress believes the 
FCA is a valuable and powerful tool for the federal government that 
courts should not limit.  Congress has decided to expand liability, 
increase the number of scenarios in which individuals can bring 
claims and also increase the award for potential relators as well.  The 
revisions have shown that Congress is not only comfortable with, 
but fully supports the expansive private-enforcement scheme 
created to combat fraud. 
III. CASES OF ATTORNEY-RELATORS 
In United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp., the District Court of the 
Eastern District of Virginia decided whether an attorney’s 
participation in a qui tam action against the attorney’s former 
employer violated state ethical rules of conduct.75  The Doe court 
also squarely addressed the issue of whether it was proper for 
 
U.S. 280, 290 (2010). 
 70  31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i) (2010). 
 71  Id. at § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
 72  Helmer, supra note 14, at 1280. 
 73  Helmer, supra note 14, at 1280. 
 74  31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(3) (2010). 
 75  Doe III, 862 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D. Va. 1994).  
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attorneys to serve as relators in qui tam suits brought against former 
clients.76  John Doe, in-house counsel for X Corp., became 
concerned that X Corp. might be violating multiple provisions of 
the Federal Acquisition Regulations.77  After reporting his suspicions 
to X Corp., Doe began a thorough investigation of the perceived 
wrongdoing.78 
X Corp. abruptly brought Doe’s investigation to a halt, however, 
by transferring Doe to another office and shifting the primary 
control of the inquiry to another in-house counsel.79  Despite being 
moved, Doe continued his investigation into the matter.80  After a 
year, Doe expressed his dissatisfaction to other members of the X 
Corp. legal team again, reiterating the potential violations of the 
regulation that he believed X Corp. was perpetrating as well as 
expressing dissatisfaction over the speed in which the investigation 
was being completed.81  Three months later, X Corp. terminated 
Doe.82  In an effort to correct the perceived wrongdoing of his 
former employer, Doe took approximately 4,300 copies of 
documents belonging to X Corp. that he believed supported his 
allegations of fraudulent activity and filed a qui tam suit under the 
FCA.83 
The qui tam suit involved a number of trials.84  Eventually, X 
Corp. reached a settlement with the government to clear the 
corporation of liability under the FCA.85  However, Doe was not 
satisfied.  He demanded a reward as a relator as well as attorney’s 
fees.86  X Corp. balked at the demand, arguing that Doe’s role as X 
Corp.’s former in-house counsel barred him from properly serving 
as a relator in the FCA claim.87  X Corp. filed a motion to dismiss 
 
 76  Id. at 1506–08. 
 77  Id. at 1504. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1504. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. 
 84  See X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff’d, Under Seal v. Under 
Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994) (Doe I); X Corp v. Doe, 816 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Va. 
1993) (Doe II). 
 85  Doe III, 862 F. Supp. 1502, 1505 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
 86  Id. at 1505–06. 
 87  Id. 
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Doe’s claims for an award and attorney’s fees, or, in the alternative, 
summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue.88 
The Doe court reviewed the FCA, focusing on the provisions 
which expressly barred relators from bringing certain claims.89  
Claims brought by attorney-relators were conspicuously absent 
from this list.90  In the absence of a statutory provision to the 
contrary, the District Court held attorneys could not be prohibited 
from serving as a relator in an action against a former client.91 
X Corp. insisted that Congress did not intend for a counsel to 
serve as a relator in qui tam suits filed against former clients because 
doing so would destroy the sacred relationship between attorneys 
and their clients.92  Furthermore, allowing attorneys to serve as 
relators would incentivize those individuals to “flout their ethical 
obligations” and use the client’s confidential information for their 
own personal gain.93  Clients would therefore be hesitant to seek 
help from their attorneys, as any disclosure made by the client could 
potentially serve as the fuel for a qui tam suit under the FCA.94 
The Doe court was unimpressed by the argument, citing several 
reasons for disagreeing with X Corp.’s analysis.95  First, X Corp.’s 
concerns rang hollow; nothing in the FCA preempted any state 
ethical obligations that an attorney owed to their client.96  Second, 
the FCA did not require attorneys to file qui tam suits.97  The statute 
merely made qui tam suits permissive.98  Third, the court argued the 
FCA does not shield an attorney from liability from state law 
claims.99  Fourth, injunctive or declaratory relief could be made 





 88  Id. 
 89  Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1505. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1506. 
 92  Id. at 1507. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1507. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. 
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Putting the aforementioned arguments aside, the court 
explained that Congress simply had not included attorneys in the 
list of individuals prohibited from serving as a relator.101  Such a 
prohibition was for the legislature to decide, not the courts.102  
Including attorneys as relators served the legislative intent of the 
FCA “to enhance the Government’s ability to recover losses 
sustained as a result of fraud against the Government.”103 
In Bury v. Community Hospitals of Central California, the 
former general counsel for a hospital filed a qui tam suit under the 
California state False Claims Act against his former employer and 
the County of Fresno.104  Bury alleged the County was improperly 
receiving funding for providing medical services to the indigent 
because his former employer had assumed sole responsibility for 
those duties under a contract and lease arrangement with the 
County.105  The hospital moved to have the case dismissed, arguing 
that Bury violated ethical and statutory duties of confidentiality by 
pursuing his qui tam suit against a former client.106 
Referencing the District Court’s decision in Doe III, the Court 
of Appeal of California noted Bury’s status as a former general 
counsel did not preclude the qui tam suit.107  However, the court 
held Bury’s duty of loyalty and confidentiality to his former client, 
the hospital, precluded his qui tam suit.108  The court explained an 
attorney and client are in a fiduciary relationship “of the highest 
character.”109  It is the duty of the attorney to “to maintain inviolate 
the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve 
the secrets, of his or her client.”110  Bury was under an obligation to 
protect his client “in every possible way.”111 
The District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia engaged in 
a balancing of federal and state interests similar to the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach in United States ex rel. Fair Lab. 
 
 101  Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1508. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1508 (quoting S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1986)). 
 104  No. F036667, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035, at *2 (May 8, 2002). 
 105  Id. at *4. 
 106  Id. at *4-5. 
 107  Id. at *7. 
 108  Id. at *10-12. 
 109  Id. at *10 (citing Zador Corp. v. Kwan, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1285, 1293 (1995)). 
 110  Bury v. Cmty. Hosps. of Cent. Cal., No. F036667, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1035, at *10 (May 8, 2002) (quoting Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e) (2016)). 
 111  Id. at *11. 
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Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.112  Unilab Corporation, 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (“Quest”), 
was sued under the False Claims Act by a partnership created by 
three former executives.113  One of the executives was Mark Bibi, the 
former general counsel of Unilab.114  The partnership alleged Unilab 
and Quest violated the Federal Health Care Anti-Kickback Act, 42. 
U.S.C. § 1320a– 7b(b) (“AKS”) by offering medical device testing 
services to clients at low rates in order to receive a greater number 
of referrals for Medicaid and Medicare patients.115 
In 1996, Bibi informed executives at Unilab that this “pull 
through scheme” was a potential violation of the AKS.116  In 
response, Unilab raised their prices, resulting in a loss of business 
to competitors.117  In 1999, Unilab hired new executives that 
lowered the price of the medical device testing services to their 
previous rates.118  Again, Bibi expressed his concern that the pull 
through scheme was likely illegal.119  This time, however, Unilab 
executives refused to consult with Bibi on any compliance issues 
and eventually replaced him as general counsel.120 
Prior to joining the qui tam suit, Bibi consulted the New York 
Code of Professional Responsibility and the American Bar 
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct to determine if his 
participation in the qui tam suit would violate any ethical 
obligations.121  Bibi did not believe his participation in the FCA case 
would be problematic because Unilab continued to defraud the 
United States government.122  In the ensuing litigation, Quest and 
Unilab disagreed with Bibi’s interpretation of the rules, arguing they 
would be unduly prejudiced if the plaintiffs would be allowed to 
proceed using confidential information Bibi had gained through his 
relationship with the defendants.123 
 
 112  United States v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d 154, 157 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 113  United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 05 
Civ. 5393, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011). 
 114  Id. at *6. 
 115  Id. at *2. 
 116  Id. at *9-10. 
 117  Id. at *10. 
 118  Id. 
 119  United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 05 
Civ. 5393, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011). 
 120  Id. at *12-13. 
 121  Id. at *15-16. 
 122  Id. at *16. 
 123  Id. at *19. 
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York explained that when state ethical rules clash with federal 
interests, federal courts must interpret the rule in such a way as to 
balance the varying interests between federal and state law.124  The 
court noted that nothing in the FCA shielded a relator from liability 
from state statutes.125  The court found that Bibi’s disclosure of 
Quest’s confidential information did not meet the requirements of 
the New York Code of Professional Responsibility’s “ongoing 
crime” exception.126  The information that Bibi disclosed was 
excessive because he not only disclosed confidential information to 
the other members of FLPA, but he also disclosed information to 
the government and another relator in a California qui tam suit.127  
The court dismissed the complaint and prohibited Bibi and FLPA, 
including any of its members, from bringing a suit against the 
defendants based upon the facts of the case.128 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal.129  Much like the district court, the 
Second Circuit found no language in the FCA that preempted any 
state statutes; Bibi was still liable for any violation of state rules.130  
The appellate court recognized, however, that state rules could run 
“antithetical to federal interests,” and so the judges proceeded to 
decide the appeal by balancing the relevant state and federal 
interests.131 
Although Bibi could have reasonably believed the defendants 
were going to commit a crime via the pull through scheme, the 
Second Circuit believed Bibi’s disclosure of Quest’s confidences was 
beyond what was necessary to prevent the commission of a crime 
within the meaning of New York Code of Professional 
Responsibility DR 4–101.132  The rule prohibits attorneys from 
revealing confidences or secrets of clients, using confidences or 
secrets of clients to the disadvantage of clients, and using 
 
 124  Id. at *20–21 (citing Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 
1995)). 
 125  United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 05 
Civ. 5393, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011) (citing United 
States ex rel. Doe v. X. Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (E.D. Va. 1994)). 
 126  Id. at *38. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. 
 129  United States v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 130  Id. at 165. 
 131  Id. at 163. 
 132  Id. at 164–65. 
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confidences or secrets of clients to the advantage of a third party, 
absent consent.133 
Attorneys are permitted to make a disclosure, however, if they 
reveal both “the intention of a client to commit a crime and the 
information necessary to prevent the crime.”134  The court explained 
that New York Rule 1.6(b) effectively balanced the federal interests 
at stake by permitting attorneys to disclose information “necessary” 
to prevent the commission of a crime.135  Bibi had many alternatives 
available to him besides disclosing information to the extent at 
which he did.136  The Second Circuit held that his conduct was not 
protected and dismissed the suit against the defendants to prevent 
any undue prejudice to Unilab or Quest Diagnostics.137 
IV. EVIDENTIARY OBSTACLES & ETHICAL RULES 
The Quest and Doe courts were quite adamant in their 
assertions that attorneys were not categorically barred from serving 
as relators in qui tam actions.  Both courts noted Congress intended 
the FCA to have a broad reach.  The classes of individuals who could 
potentially serve as relators were broad in order to assist the 
government in its fight against fraud.  Although nothing bars 
attorneys from serving as relators, ethical and evidentiary rules make 
it exceedingly difficult for attorney-relators to bring successful qui 
tam claims.138 
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege exists in every American 
jurisdiction in some form, either by statute, evidence code, or 
common law.139  The privilege protects the communications that 
transpire between an attorney and a client when the client is 
obtaining legal advice.140  A form of the attorney-client privilege also 
exists between a corporation’s in-house counsel and corporate 
 
 133  NEW YORK CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4–101 (2013). 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id.; Quest, 734 F.3d at 164. 
 136  Quest, 734 F.3d at 164–65. 
 137  Id. at 167-68. 
 138  For a more detailed examination of the interplay between ethical and 
evidentiary rules and the attorney-relator, see Kathleen M. Boozang, The New Relators: 
In-House Counsel and Compliance Officers, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 16 (2012). 
 139  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 140  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
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representatives.141  In essence, the privilege gives clients and 
attorneys the right to not divulge what they communicate to one 
another.142  Privilege is created when a communication is made 
between privileged persons in confidence for the purpose of 
obtaining or providing legal services to the client.143  The protection 
continues so long as the confidence is maintained.144 
To invoke the attorney-client privilege as a shield an individual 
must first show that a “communication” took place, defined as “any 
expression through which a privileged person . . . undertakes to 
convey information to another privileged person and any document 
or other record revealing such an expression.”145  The 
communication may be a face-to-face conversation, telephone call, 
memorandum, e–mail, text message, or any other mode of 
exchanging information.146  Additionally, the communication need 
not even succeed to receive protection.147  The privilege only 
prevents disclosure of the communication between the attorney and 
client; it does not, however, protect the disclosure of the underlying 
facts of the conversation.148 
Second, the communication must occur between privileged 
persons.149  Privileged persons include “the client [], the client’s 
lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between 
them, and agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representation.”150  
Whether the client is currently represented by an attorney or is a 
prospective client does not matter; the privilege will protect 
communications from either type of client.151  The protection does 
not extend to non-privileged persons, however.152  Thus, any 
communication between a privileged person and a non-privileged 
individual falls outside the purview of the privilege.153 
 
 141  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 78 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 142  Id. § 68 cmt. d. 
 143  Id. § 68. 
 144  Id. § 79. 
 145  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 146  Id. § 69 cmt. b. 
 147  Id. § 69 cmt. c. 
 148  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 149  Id. § 70. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. § 70 cmt. c. 
 152  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 153  Id. 
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With regard to the confidence requirement, a client must 
reasonably believe that the communication is confidential before 
they may assert privilege over the communication.154  However, the 
Restatement notes that a client’s intention is not “determinative.”155  
For example, a client may not be found to have a reasonable belief 
a communication was confidential if the communication was made 
in a public place.156  Additionally, the presence of a third party can 
destroy the privilege whether or not the client intended for the 
communication to be confidential.157 
The final element an individual must show to claim the 
protection of the privilege is that the communication was for the 
purpose of “obtaining or providing legal services.”158  The standard 
is met if a communication is made to either an attorney or a person 
whom the prospective client reasonably believes is an attorney is 
consulted for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance.159  The 
phrase “legal assistance” includes legal counseling, but also includes 
“document preparation, litigation services, or any other assistance 
customarily performed by lawyers in their professional capacity.”160 
Once obtained, the attorney-client privilege may be waived in 
few circumstances.  Clients can waive the privilege themselves by 
divulging the privileged information voluntarily to a non– 
privileged person.161  Clients may also waive the privilege if they put 
the privileged communication into issue in a legal matter, such as a 
suit for legal malpractice.162  An attorney may waive the privilege if 
expressly authorized by a client, if impliedly authorized by a client, 
or if the client relates information to a third party to the effect that 
the attorney may waive the privilege.163  Attorneys may also waive 




 154  Id. § 70 cmt. f. 
 155  Id. § 70 cmt. b. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. 
 158  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 159  Id. 
 160  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 161  Id. § 79. 
 162  Id. § 80. 
 163  Id. § 78 cmt. b. 
 164  Id. 
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The maxim relies upon the reasoning that accurate and just legal 
advice depends upon the ability of the client to disclose information 
to their attorney without fear of having their information 
disclosed.165  Without the fear of disclosure, clients communicate 
freely with their attorneys, which “encourages observance of the law 
and aids in the administration of justice.”166  By affording the client 
the protection of the attorney–client privilege, a client is more likely 
to disclose all of the facts in a given circumstance, allowing the 
attorney to comment and advise the client comprehensively on their 
legal obligations and how a client may best comply with the law.167 
Bibi’s comments that the pull–through scheme potentially 
exposed Quest to liability under various federal laws could 
potentially be considered privileged communications.  Quest could 
have raised the attorney-client privilege as a shield, barring Bibi 
from disclosing information he communicated to Quest or 
information communicated to Bibi from Quest in connection with 
Bibi’s legal services.  Thinking about attorney-relators more 
generally, the attorney-client privilege may in fact preclude some 
evidence from being brought forward, perhaps a warning from an 
attorney to a client that a certain action could potentially lead to 
fraud.  The underlying facts, however, would be most important to 
any qui tam suit, and these facts lie outside the protection of the 
privilege. 
B. The Duty of Confidentiality 
It is important to note that the duty of confidentiality cited by 
the Quest court is distinct from the attorney-client privilege.  The 
Second Circuit decided Quest on Bibi’s failure to protect Quest’s 
confidences, which violated the professional duty of confidentiality 
Bibi owed his client.  The protection of client-confidentiality 
afforded by Rule 1.6 is much broader than the protection of the 
attorney-client privilege.168  In contrast to the privilege, Rule 1.6 is 
applicable in situations other than when evidence is sought from an 
 
 165  Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The privilege 
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice 
or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”). 
 166  Commodity Futures Trading Com’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1983) 
(citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389). 
 167  Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality 
Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 858 (1998). 
 168  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
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attorney under compulsion of law.169  The rule prohibits an attorney 
from making a disclosure of client confidences unless the disclosure 
is authorized by law or the professional rules.170  The American Bar 
Association’s guidelines for confidentiality, Model Rule 1.6(a), 
states a “lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, 
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”171 
Client confidentiality covers both information related to the 
representation of a client and any information that could 
“reasonably lead to the discovery” of information of the client.172  
Model Rule 1.6 also shields any personal information relating to the 
client that the client would not want generally known.173  
Information taken from interviews, documents, photographs or 
other sources also fall under the umbrella of confidentiality.174  
Lastly, information about the client need not be gained during the 
course of the representation in order to trigger the duty; any 
information the attorney gains concerning a client before the 
representation begins or after the representation is terminated is 
protected by the rule.175 
Model Rule 1.6 also contains provisions detailing when an 
attorney may permissibly reveal client confidences.176  Rule 1.6(b) 
states a “lawyer may reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary” to accomplish one of seven possible 
outcomes.177  Two exceptions, Rule 1.6(b)(2) and Rule 1.6(b)(3), 
are most relevant to the discussion of the FCA. 
With regard to Rule 1.6(b)(2), the rules state an attorney may 
reveal confidential client information when she reasonably believes 
it is necessary to “prevent the client from committing a crime or 
fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the 
financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of 
 
 169  Id. 
 170  See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 171  Id. r. 1.6(a). 
 172  Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 4. 
 173  Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 2. 
 174  Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 3. 
 175  Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 20. 
 176  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 177  Id. 
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which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services.”178  Rule 
1.6(b)(2) is a forward-looking rule; here, the drafters of the Model 
Rules were concerned with future frauds that would be committed. 
Attorneys may only disclose information when they are reasonably 
certain a substantial injury will result.179  Even if they are reasonably 
certain, Rule 1.6(b)(2) further limits the attorney to disclosing 
information only when the client has used the attorney’s services to 
further the fraud.180 
In contrast, Rule 1.6(b)(3) contemplates fraud that a client has 
already committed.181  Rule 1.6(b)(3) states an attorney may reveal 
confidential client information when she reasonably believes the 
revelation will “prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the 
financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain 
to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or 
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s 
services.”182 
Regardless of whether the fraud in question is a past or future 
fraud, the disclosure exception highlights three requirements that 
must be met before a lawyer may disclose confidential information.  
First, the lawyer must be reasonably certain the client’s actions will 
result in substantial financial injury or substantial injury to the 
property of another person.183  Second, the client must actually use 
the lawyer’s services to further the fraud.184  Third, the disclosure is 
only permitted to prevent a fraud from being committed or to 
prevent, rectify, or mitigate the harm resulting from a previous 
fraud.185 
C. Former Client Confidences 
An attorney’s duty to maintain client confidences does not 
terminate at the end of the relationship.186  Model Rule 1.9(a) 
provides that an attorney who has represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter represent another individual in a “substantially 
related matter” in which the individual’s interests are materially 
 
 178  Id. r. 1.6(b)(2). 
 179  Id. 
 180  Id. 
 181  See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 182  Id. 
 183  Id. r. 1.6(b)(2) & (3). 
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. 
 186  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
DUMNICH NOTE - MACROS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2016  11:19 PM 
2016] GOING ROGUE: ATTORNEY-RELATORS 487 
adverse to the former client’s interests.187  Matters are “substantially 
related” if they involve the same transaction or dispute.188  
Furthermore, matters may be considered “substantially related” if 
there is a “substantial risk” that a client’s position in a subsequent 
matter would be materially advanced because of confidential factual 
information as would normally have been obtained in the prior 
representation.189  This prohibition can be waived if the client gives 
informed consent, confirmed in writing.190 
Additionally, Rule 1.9(c) provides additional proscriptions 
regarding the use of confidential information obtained from former 
clients.191  Attorneys are prohibited from using information gained 
during a representation to the disadvantage of a former client.192  
The rule provides two exceptions.  First, if the information is 
generally known, the attorney may use the confidential 
information.193  Second, if the attorney would otherwise be 
permitted by the Model Rules to use the information, the attorney 
is permitted to use the information as well.194  Additionally, Rule 
1.9(c)(2) prohibits an attorney from revealing information related 
to the representation of a former client, except as would otherwise 
be required or permitted by the Model Rules with respect to a 
client.195 
D. Pleading Problems 
Qui tam suits implicate fraud, so any complaint offered by a 
relator must be plead with particularity.196  Relators need to 
establish the “who, what, when, where and how” of the fraudulent 
schemes: courts have requested information such as the dates in 
which the fraudulent claims were filed, the names of individuals 
who filed the fraudulent claims, the amount of money charged to 
the government, and a description of the goods and services that 
were billed in order for relators to keep their false claim filings 
 
 187  Id. r. 1.9(a). 
 188  Id. r. 1.9 cmt. 3. 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. 
 191  Id. r. 1.9(c). 
 192  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(c)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. 
 195  Id. r. 1.9(c)(2). 
 196  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen, 68 F.3d 1475, 1477 (2d Cir. 
1995); United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose–Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 228 
(1st Cir. 2004). 
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afloat.197  General outlines of fraudulent schemes, even when 
provided in great detail, are by themselves insufficient to satisfy the 
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).198 
The case for relators is not hopeless, however, as a number of 
federal circuits have deployed relaxed pleading standards for Rule 
9(b) in certain circumstances.  When the evidence of fraud is 
particularly in the control of the defendant, some courts have 
evaluated complaints with lesser scrutiny.199  In the First Circuit, 
courts have permitted relators to introduce statistical evidence to 
boost their pleadings past the threshold of acceptability rather than 
provide information of specific false claims.200  The Fifth Circuit has 
adopted a relaxed standard in cases that contemplate a complex 
fraud occurring over a large number of years, recognizing it would 
be burdensome to require a relator to provide detailed information 
on such a large volume of claims.201  The Ninth Circuit has similarly 
relaxed the pleading requirement.202  Relators in the Fourth Circuit 
need only to produce a representative sample of fraudulent claims 
in order for a qui tam suit to proceed to discovery.203  The Sixth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits also follow a similar standard.204 
E. Accounting Rule 
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
includes a number of provisions regarding an attorney’s use of 
 
 197  United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield, 472 F.3d 702, 
727 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997) & Koch v. Koch Indus., 203 F.3d 
1202, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000)); United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, No. 04–cv–0704, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43438, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009). 
 198  United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 
2002); see also United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose–Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 
220, 225 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 199  See Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 200  United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st 
Cir. 2009). 
 201  United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 202  Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We join the Fifth 
Circuit in concluding, in accord with general pleading requirements under Rule 9(b), 
that it is sufficient to allege ‘particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired 
with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually 
submitted.’”). 
 203  United States ex rel. Noah Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 
455–56 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 204  United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 510 (6th 
Cir. 2007); United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th 
Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 
1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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confidential client information.205  One unique provision contained 
in the Restatement includes Section 60(2), which states “except as 
stated in [section] 62, a lawyer who uses confidential information 
of a client for the lawyer’s pecuniary gain other than in the practice 
of law must account to the client for any profits made.”206  The rule 
is primarily concerned with situations where a lawyer may unjustly 
enrich himself due to information he possesses about his client.207  
Unlike the other rules pertaining to the attorney’s use of the client’s 
confidential information contained in the Restatement, the lawyer 
is prohibited from using confidential information of the client even 
if the use of such information would not risk prejudice to the 
client.208  Borrowing rules from the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states that in 
situations where a lawyer has personally enriched himself from the 
impermissible use of confidential client information, the only 
proper remedy for the client is “restitutionary relief in the form of 
disgorgement of profit.”209 
A lawyer may escape the clutches of the accounting language of 
section 60(2) in two circumstances.  First, the lawyer may 
permissibly use confidential client information for the lawyer’s 
personal gain if the client consents to the use of the information.210  
Second, a lawyer may use confidential client information from one 
client to assist in the representation of another client, so long as the 
result of such information sharing does not result in a material risk 
of harm to the original client.211  Such use is permitted even though 
it could result in a personal gain for the lawyer himself.212 
Although the Restatement does not reflect binding law, a single 
state, Louisiana, has drawn parallels between the language in the 
Restatement and its own mandatary law.213  An attorney who uses 
confidential client information for his own benefit may be liable as 
 
 205  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 60–69 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2016). 
 206  Id. § 60(2). 
 207  Id. § 60(2) cmt. j. 
 208  Id. 
 209  Id. § 60(2) cmt. j.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
1958). 
 210  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2) cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 211  Id. 
 212  Id. 
 213  Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2), with LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 3004, 3005 cmt. b (1997). 
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a fiduciary for a claim of misappropriation of confidential 
information.214  Furthermore, the Louisiana Civil Code provides 
that mandataries owe their principals everything they received by 
virtue of the mandate.215 This rule applies to anything unduly gained 
by the mandatary as well.216 
F. Summary 
Evidentiary rules and ethical requirements make life difficult for 
an attorney-relator.  All relators, attorney or not, must plead their 
causes of action with sufficient particularity in order to survive a 
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.  Such a rule necessarily raises the 
difficulty of successfully pleading a complaint.  Particularity 
becomes even more of a problem for the would-be attorney-relator, 
however, because the relator is prohibited from using a number of 
different sources of information due to either evidentiary or ethical 
rules. 
In trying to plead a complaint with particularity, the attorney 
must make sure not to base her claim on any communication that 
took place between the attorney and client for the provision of legal 
services, as the attorney-client privilege would protect these 
communications.  Additionally, any information gained during the 
course of the representation that either relates to the representation 
or could potentially lead to the discovery of information that relates 
to the representation, is also barred from disclosure by Rule 1.6.  
Unless otherwise permitted by the Model Rules, the attorney would 
also be prohibited from using information gained during the course 
of the representation to the disadvantage of a former client or 
revealing that information to others. 
Assuming an attorney was able to craft a complaint with 
particularity that did not rely upon any communication for the 
provision of legal services or any information gained during the 
course of the representation or could lead to the discovery of 
information related to the representation, a qui tam suit would be 
able to move forward.  However, in some jurisdictions, the 
attorney’s use of client information to personally enrich himself 
may be considered a violation of the attorney’s fiduciary duty to his 
client.  Even if the qui tam suit were successful, the attorney would 
 
 214  Defcon, Inc. v. Webb, 687 So. 2d 639, 643 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Woodward v. 
Steed, 680 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 215  LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 3004 (2015). 
 216  Id. 
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need to account back to his client any money he gained from a qui 
tam suit. 
The Quest, Bury, and Doe III courts mentioned that attorneys 
were included in the class of persons eligible to serve as relators in 
qui tam suits.  The analysis above, however, demonstrates just how 
difficult serving as an attorney-relator can be.  A more workable 
solution may be to advocate for changes to state ethical rules to 
allow for attorneys to disclose acts of fraud occurring within an 
attorney’s organization.  As the next section will detail, “loyal 
disclosure rules” are particularly suited to cure the current 
inconsistency between protecting the public coffers and the 
relationship between an attorney and his client.217 
V. LOYAL DISCLOSURE RULES – AN APPROPRIATE MIDDLE–GROUND 
Loyal disclosure rules are designed to permit attorneys, in 
certain circumstances, to reveal confidential information of their 
client, an organization.218  The action is based in the belief that the 
disclosure is necessary to protect the organization from the harmful 
conduct of one of its members.219  Disclosure is justified because it 
is in the interest of the client, the organization.220 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) first 
discussed loyal disclosure rules in response to the major financial 
scandals.221  The ABA has debated its own rules regarding 
confidentiality throughout the past century.222  In 1983, the ABA 
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.223  These rules 
affirmed the ABA’s stance of protecting client confidentiality.224 
 
 217  George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to 
Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 599 (1998).  A “loyal disclosure” is defined as “[a] 
disclosure . . . justified not despite loyalty to the client but because it is in the client’s 
interest.”  Id. 
 218  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
 219  Id. 
 220  Harris, supra note 217, at 599. 
 221  Paula Schaefer, Overcoming Noneconomic Barriers to Loyal Disclosure, 44 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 417, 429–30 (2007). 
 222  Id. 
 223  American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). 
 224  American Bar Association adopted confidentiality rules that stated that an 
attorney may only disclose confidential information of a client to protect a third party 
from “imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).  
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In the wake of a number of highly publicized corporate 
scandals, the ABA created the Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility.225  The purpose of the task force was to evaluate the 
legal and ethical considerations present in the corporate context.226  
In the face of such widespread failures by a number of large 
corporate entities, the ABA wished to make recommendations to 
attorneys, business officers, and regulators on how to best handle 
issues of corporate governance.227 
The testimony largely emphasized that when an individual 
engages in conduct that injures an organization, attorneys owe a 
duty to their organization not to the organization members.228  The 
Task Force rejected the idea that organizations would keep their in-
house counsel at arm’s length for fear of reporting if the proposed 
rules were adopted.229  Organizational clients present a unique 
concern: the attorney may be forced to disclose information in order 
to prevent substantial injury to an organization based upon a 
constituent’s actions.230  The end result was the adoption of Rule 
1.13.231 
A. State Loyal Disclosure Statutes 
Twenty-eight states have adopted organizational client rules 
similar to the 2003 proposed amendments.232  In general, the rule 
charges lawyers with proceeding with whatever is reasonably 
 
 225  Final Report, ABA Presidential Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (August 
11-12, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/ 
final_report.pdf. 
 226  Schaefer, supra note 221, at 429. 
 227  Schaefer, supra note 221, at 429–30. 
 228  Final Report, supra note 225, at 12. 
 229  Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and 
the 2003 Changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 35, 48 (2003). 
 230  Schaefer, supra note 221, at 430. 
 231  Schaefer, supra note 221, at 430-31. 
 232  ALASKA R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2009); ARIZ. R.P.C. r. 1.13 (2004); ARK. R.P.C. r. 
1.13(c) (2016); COLO. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2007); CONN. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2016); GA. 
R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2001); HAW. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2014); IDAHO R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) 
(2004); IL. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2010); IND. R.P.C. r. 1.13 (2005); IOWA R.P.C. r. 
32:1.13(c) (2013); KY. S.C.R. 3.130(1.13) (2009); LA. ST. Bar Ass’n. Art. XVI § 1.13(c) 
(2016); MASS. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2013); NEB. CT. R.P.C. § 3-501.1.13(c) (2008); NEV. 
R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2007); N.H. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2008); N.M. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2008); 
N.D. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2006); OK. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2007); OR. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) 
(2015); R.I. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (DATE); S.C. R.P.C. R. 1.13(c) (2015); UTAH R., R.P.C. r. 
1.13(c) (2013); VT. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2009); WASH. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2006); W. VA. 
R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2015); WY. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2014). 
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necessary to protect the organization.233  When a lawyer knows that 
a member of the organization is “engaged in action, intends to act 
or refuses to act in a matter” that violates a legal obligation the 
member owes to the organization or will result in a legal violation 
that “could reasonably be imputed to the organization,” the loyal 
disclosure rule is implicated.234  In these circumstances, that lawyer 
is required to act as is reasonably necessary to protect the best 
interests of the organization.235  Rule 1.13(b) requires the lawyer to 
report the matter to a higher authority unless the lawyer reasonably 
believes it is not in the best interest of the organization.236  If the 
highest authority of the organization fails to remedy the situation, 
and the attorney reasonably believes the legal violation is 
reasonably certain to occur and will result in substantial injury to 
the organization, the attorney may disclose information regardless 
of whether Rule 1.6 would prohibit the disclosure.237 
Three states adopted loyal disclosure rules that are similar to the 
proposal that the ABA House of Delegates rejected in 1980.238  The 
basic structure of these loyal disclosure rules is similar to Rule 113.  
Under these rules, loyal disclosures to individuals outside of the 
organization are only permitted when an attorney reasonably 
believes the organization’s highest authority has acted to further the 
personal or financial interests of members of that authority “which 
are in conflict with the interest of the organization,” and that the 
disclosure is necessary in the best interest of the organization.”239 
Another variation in state loyal disclosure rules is the specific 
conduct recommended to attorneys by the rule.  Using the New 
Jersey rule as an example, attorneys are advised to take a more global 
approach to problem solving when confronted with potential legal 
violations; lawyers are asked to consider the severity of the violation, 
the motivations of the involved parties, the consequences to the 
organization, and a host of other factors essential to making an 
informed decision.240  The attorney has a duty to minimize both 
disruption to the organization and the risk that confidential 
 
 233  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
 234  Id. 
 235  Id. 
 236  Id. 
 237  Id. r. 1.13(c)(1) & (2). 
 238  MD. LAWYER’S R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2016); M.R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2016); N.J. R.P.C. r. 
1.13(c) (1994). 
 239  MD. LAWYER’S R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (1) & (2); M.R.P.C. r. 1.13(c)(1) & (2); N.J. R.P.C. 
r. 1.13(c)(1) & (2). 
 240  N.J. R.P.C. r. 1.13(b). 
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information will be revealed.241  A number of actions that are 
available to attorneys are enumerated in the rule itself.  Counsel 
could ask management to reconsider the matter.242  An attorney 
could also obtain the opinion of an outside counsel.243  Although it 
may be difficult, in-house counsel could also choose to report the 
matter to a higher authority if they do not find a receptive ear from 
lower level management.244 
B. Adoption of Loyal Disclosure Rules 
i. Removing Rewards for Rogues: Providing an Ethical Out 
Widespread adoptions of loyal disclosure rules would provide 
an attorney with an alternative vehicle to the FCA to prevent and 
stop fraud from occurring at her organization.  One of the most 
important changes this would bring is the removal of money as a 
motivation for action.  It is important to remember the FCA’s 
genesis was the idea of using a “rogue to catch a rogue.”  Quest 
Diagnostics stated dissatisfaction with Bibi for disclosing 
confidential information he acquired during the course of their 
relationship for his own personal gain.245 
In the context of the rules discussed previously, widespread 
adoption of Rule 1.13 would fix any problems with the Restatement 
§ 60(2) or La. Civ. Code art. 3004.  These rules only contemplate 
situations where an attorney personally enriches himself by using 
client information.  Rule 1.13 does not provide any sort of award; 
the disclosure is made as a matter of ethics, not as a legal claim.  
Without any potential qui tam reward for serving as a relator, the 
whole question of whether an accounting is owed becomes 
irrelevant. 
ii. Confidentiality Conundrum: Rules 1.6 and 1.9 
In addition to removing financial incentives for attorneys, the 
widespread adoption of Rule 1.13 presents a solution to 
maneuvering around the broad confidentiality restrictions of Rule 
1.6 and 1.9.  As discussed previously, the amount of information 
protected by the duty of confidentiality is broad.  Much of the 
 
 241  Id. 
 242  Id. r. 1.13(b)(1). 
 243  Id. r. 1.13(b)(2). 
 244  Id. r. 1.13(b)(3). 
 245  United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 05 
Civ. 5393, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011). 
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information an attorney would use for a qui tam suit would be 
information related to the representation of the organization or 
information that could lead to confidential information of the 
organization.  The exceptions to Rule 1.6 currently do not provide 
attorneys with a workable solution either; the requirement that the 
organization’s agent uses the attorney’s services to further the fraud 
severely limits the number of scenarios in which an attorney could 
disclose the information. 
Rule 1.13(c)(2) provides a better framework for dealing with 
the fraudulent activity of an organizational client.  First, the rule 
permits disclosure regardless of whether Rule 1.6(b) would permit 
disclosure.246  This language is key in removing the “attorney’s 
services” hurdle.  Second, Rule 1.13(c)(2) is also narrow enough in 
scope that attorneys will not engage in fishing expeditions to root 
out fraud.  The rule limits disclosures to those situations where the 
attorney reasonably believes a substantial injury to the organization 
is reasonably certain to occur.247  Additionally, disclosure is 
permitted only to the extent an attorney reasonably believes it is 
necessary to prevent injury to the organization.248  With regard to 
Rule 1.9, the loyal disclosure rules do not provide much help. 
Although attorneys are permitted to both use information to the 
disadvantage of a former client and reveal information related to the 
representation when the use of the information would “otherwise 
be permitted by the rules,” the disclosure provisions of Rule 1.13 
only apply to attorneys employed or retained by an organization. 
iii. Privilege and Particularity 
Rule 1.13 provides a solution to the particularity pleading 
problem by giving attorneys a way of avoiding the issue altogether.  
Loyal disclosure rules are an ethical obligation and not a cause of 
action.  Therefore, attorneys are not required to submit a complaint 
to utilize them, nor are they required to provide a description of the 
fraudulent scheme in excruciating detail.  In fact, Rule 1.13 places a 
duty upon attorneys to minimize the amount of confidential 
information that is disclosed.  Such a provision effectively balances 
the confidentiality of the organization with the government’s 
interest in detecting and preventing fraud. 
 
 246  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
 247  Id. r. 1.6(b)(2). 
 248  Id. 
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In contrast, privilege creates a more difficult problem.  
Although Rule 1.13 may permit disclosure if the requirements are 
met, the client would still retain the right to invoke the attorney–
client privilege during any resulting proceeding.  By raising the 
privilege as a shield, the organization would bar any 
communication between the organization’s constituents and the 
attorney for the provision of legal services from coming into 
evidence.  Unlike the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), the 
attorney–client privilege seems to be an immovable obstacle. 
One important distinction between the attorney–client 
privilege and the other ethical and evidentiary rules discussed in this 
Note is the amount of information protected by the privilege.  The 
attorney–client privilege may be strong, but it covers such a tiny 
amount of behavior that it hardly seems a qui tam suit would fail 
by the exclusion of that evidence alone.  Model Rule 113(b) requires 
that a substantial injury to the organization be “likely” before an 
attorney is permitted to act.249  A single communication for the 
provision of legal services may prove to be insufficient for the 
attorney to believe an injury is “likely.”  Additionally, the attorney–
client privilege only protects the communication that took place 
between the attorney and client.  The underlying facts relevant to 
that communication, facts that would most likely serve as evidence 
of fraud, would be fair game. 
iv. Solitary Snag: The Problem of Individuals 
The ethical mandate of Rule 1.13 provides attorney-relators 
who formerly represent organizational clients such as those 
discussed in Quest and Doe with the ability to take corrective action 
against fraud without relying upon the FCA.  However, as the 
organization in question grows smaller, and the former client 
becomes less of a large corporation and more of an individual 
person, Rule 1.13 becomes less applicable. 
The comments to Rule 1.13 state that an “organization” is a 
legal entity that is incapable of taking action on its own. 250  Instead, 
officers, directors, employees, shareholders, other constituents, or 
their equivalents act on behalf of the organization.251  
Unincorporated associations are also included under the purview of 
 
 249  Id. r. 1.13(b). 
 250  Id. r. 1.13 cmt. 1. 
 251  Id. 
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the rule.252  The language of the Rule itself considers a situation 
where a helpless legal entity has been hijacked by malfeasant 
managers looking to raid the federal treasury through some sketchy 
business practices.  In these situations, the attorney would feel 
comfortable stepping in; after all, the attorney is actually saving a 
client (the organization) from an individual who is supposed to be 
acting on the client’s behalf.  The advantage to Rule 1.13, as this 
hypothetical demonstrates, is the wrongdoer is not viewed as an 
individual whom the attorney owes ethical duties. 
The rule analysis becomes trickier as the organization shrinks, 
however.  Consider the closely held corporation.  While there may 
technically be a legal distinction between the corporation and its 
owner, in reality, there is no distinction at all.  For all intents and 
purposes, the corporation is the manager.  In these circumstances, 
disclosure of wrongdoing under Rule 1.13 for the closely held 
corporation could lead to nonsensical results. 
For example, consider a scenario where an attorney serving as 
counsel for a corporation, wholly owned by a single individual, 
finds the owner of said corporation is falsely billing the government.  
Under Rule 1.13(b), the attorney would have an obligation to report 
this wrongdoing to the shareholders of the corporation; in this case, 
the wrongdoer himself.  If the attorney, recognizing the futility in 
reporting the fraudulent conduct to the “shareholder,” were to 
report “up and out” of the corporation and make a disclosure to the 
relevant enforcement authority, penalties would be levied against 
wrongdoer: the organization/shareholder. 
Rule 1.13 is completely unavailable to attorney-relators in qui 
tam suits where the former client is an individual: no “organization” 
exists to trigger the application of the loyal disclosure rule.  For these 
situations, Congress would be well–advised to prohibit attorneys 
from bringing qui tam actions against individuals they formerly 
represented.  Although attorney-relators could chance navigating 
the maze of ethical and evidentiary rules discussed earlier, it may be 
in the best interest of the reputation of the legal profession to 
prohibit attorneys from trying to profit at the detriment of their 
former client by filing a suit under the FCA. 
 
 
 252  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The FCA remains one of the federal government’s most effective 
tools in the fight against fraud.  Relators have been crucial to the 
statute’s success.  By allowing private citizens of to file qui tam suits, 
the government has greatly increased its ability to root out and 
remedy fraud.  Naturally, the greater the number of people that can 
serve as relators, the greater the amount of fraud the government 
will be able to detect.  Limitations on who can serve as a relator 
therefore undermines the government’s important interest in 
fighting fraud.  This Note has considered one type of relator, the 
attorney-relator, and how numerous ethical and evidentiary 
considerations effectively prohibit attorneys from filing qui tam 
suits against former clients. The widespread adoption of loyal 
disclosure rules would provide a number of key solutions to the 
problems faced by organizations and attorney-relators.  Loyal 
disclosure rules are motivated by an ethical obligation, and not the 
promise of reward.  By removing money from the equation, the 
attorney is immunized from any accounting claims brought by their 
former clients.  Making disclosure an ethical duty also allows the 
attorney to prevent fraud without necessarily bringing a cause of 
action against a client.  Because the problems an attorney faces with 
regard to the particularity requirement are obviated once the matter 
is taken out of the context of a civil action, this is a key advantage. 
The most important advantage gained by loyal disclosure rules, 
however, is the ability to bypass the stringent confidentiality 
requirements of Rule 1.6.  These requirements proved to be fatal to 
attorney-relators.  The confidentiality rules block the greatest 
amount of client information and are laced with a number of 
specific requirements that effectively tie the hands of attorney-
relators.  Rule 1.13 permits attorneys to disclose confidential 
information despite being prohibited by Rule 1.6.  Rule 1.13 
provides attorneys with a number of options when the attorney 
finds a member of the organization is violating a legal duty.  These 
options help attorneys protect their clients as well as help the 
government combat fraud. 
 
